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AIMS – In the recent neuroscientific research addiction has been defined as a brain disease in 
which the addict’s brain is “hijacked”. The research indicates how the addictive cravings function 
in the brain’s reward system. At the same time growing support has emerged to a view of addic-
tion as a matter of choice. This viewpoint claims that those with addiction lack either willpower or 
the moral capacity to make the right decisions. In this article, we problematise these two models 
and argue that neither of them succeeds in providing successful and adequate means of tackling 
personal problems associated with agency and responsibility in relation to addiction. METHODS – 
The article uses means of social ethics and empirically informed analytical philosophy. RESULTS 
– After showing that the two prominent models are not sufficient in capturing the problematique of 
addictive behaviour, we propose a new approach called the affective choice model. CONCLUSIONS 
– As the disease model and the choice model fall short, we illustrate why the affective choice mod-
el is more capable of capturing the problematique of addicts’ agency than the existing models are.
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Introduction
Depending on the field, the phenomenon 
of addiction has been the focus of inter-
est from intrapersonal and social perspec-
tives. Neurosciences are increasingly fo-
cused on finding the neural mechanisms 
characteristic of addiction, while social 
sciences look for the social mechanisms 
and factors constituting and behind the ad-
dicts’ problems. On the spectrum between 
these two modes of explanation, one can 
find a myriad of models on addiction (see 
West, 2006). This article identifies two 
prominent views that present addiction 
in fundamental opposition to each other. 
These views as such are not committed 
to any specific field of study in particu-
lar, but can both be promoted in various 
disciplines. They are the so-called disease 
model and the choice model of addiction. 
Roughly, the disease model of addiction 
portrays the addict as a victim of disease 
thus lacking control required for respon-
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acteristic of addiction, namely affective 
motivation. Addictive cravings are strong 
desires whose objects and motives are af-
fective states. Addicts illustrate this in 
their behaviour in seeking hedonically 
positive (exciting and/or stimulating) 
affective states by means of substance 
abuse or addictive behaviours while the 
strength and compelling nature of these 
desires emerges in part from the hedoni-
cally negative affective states in which 
addicts find themselves, due to personal 
problems or as the result of withdrawal 
symptoms. This Janus-faced affectivity of 
addictive desires explains their power of 
reversing an addict’s preferences in favour 
of addictive behaviour. Cognitive distor-
tions motivated by the need to experience 
positive affects serve the same function by 
rationalising addictive choices from the 
agent’s point of view. This phenomenon 
is more clearly visible in gambling than in 
any other addiction and therefore our dis-
cussion of the affective choice model uses 
gambling as an example.4 
In conclusion, we argue that the two 
existing models of addiction fail to cap-
ture the problems associated with addicts’ 
agency in an adequate manner, whereas 
our affective choice model succeeds in 
this task.5
The debate between the disease 
and choice model of addiction 
The medical concept of disease has been 
disputed mainly by those advancing the 
role of choice in addiction.6 The difficul-
ty in evaluating claims and viewpoints 
advanced by both parties is that many of 
those who participate in the discussion 
(therapists, researchers, policy makers) 
have either fiscal interests or a strong, often 
sible agency, whereas the choice model of 
addiction views addicts as agents making 
more or less rational choices.1
The first part of the article introduces 
the disease view and the choice view of 
addiction in more detail. It places the de-
bate between these theories into a societal 
context that involves the interests of those 
who advance certain viewpoints, both in 
the scientific study and in the treatment 
of addictive behaviours (Russell, Davies & 
Hunter, 2011). We highlight the influence 
of professional interests and particular 
research agendas on theory formation by 
contrasting the extent to which addicts are 
seen as responsible for their addictive be-
haviour and/or recovery in the two models 
of addiction. 
In the second part of the article a con-
ceptual analysis illustrates how the dis-
ease view faces serious problems and that 
the choice model falls short of capturing 
the problems addicts face in their agency. 
The analysis shows how addicts’ agency 
and action is conceptualised in both of the 
models in terms of control (or its lack).2 
We argue that also in light of recent neu-
roscientific research on addictive crav-
ings, addicts do have the kind of control 
over their addictive action required for 
responsible agency over that action. The 
disease model is thus rejected. However, 
we acknowledge that the notion of control 
used here is problematic in conceptualis-
ing addictive action and capturing the dif-
ficulty of addicts’ action.3 It seems to lead 
to implausible views on their responsibil-
ity. This, in turn, gives reason to reject the 
simplified choice model too. 
In the last part of the article we pro-
pose a feature to the choice model that 
succeeds in capturing the relevant char-
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preconceived and thus mostly ideological, 
personal opinion about the status of the 
disease model. Neuroscientific research 
literature, in particular, often advances the 
view that addiction is a chronic medical 
illness (Hyman & Malenka, 2001; Gutman, 
2006; Kincaid & Sullivan, 2010). 
The disease model treats addiction as a 
brain disease in which the addict’s brain 
has been “hijacked”. The research indi-
cates how the addictive cravings function 
in the brain’s rewards system. The propo-
nents of the disease view argue that these 
changes in the brain cause the hijacking 
(Leshner, 2005; Hyman, 2007; Ross, Sharp, 
Vuchinich, & Spurrett, 2008). They also 
suggest that addiction develops gradu-
ally and is a progressing illness, acquired 
through consumption of a particular sub-
stance depending on certain contingent 
matters including genetic factors, and is 
less a matter of personal choice. The dis-
ease model is often used in relation to the 
development of certain lifestyle-related 
somatic diseases. These include Type II di-
abetes, hypertension and asthma in which 
individual choice and the way of perceiv-
ing the disease is similar, both conceptu-
ally and phenomenologically (Sellman, 
2009, p. 8). More recently, neurobiological 
research that promotes the disease model 
has introduced the “brain hijacking” meta-
phor for addiction. It can, for instance, be 
argued that “drugs may capture control 
of brain mechanisms that control motiva-
tions and emotions” (Russell et al., 2011, 
p. 152). In the same vein, it has been sug-
gested that to a certain extent antecedent 
“neurophysiological forces” work in ad-
dicts’ brains, affecting motivation, even 
before they enter situations involving ei-
ther addictive substance or behaviour ca-
pable of producing gratification (Koob & 
Moal, 2008). 
In contrast to the disease model, the 
choice model of addiction starts from the 
assumption that all people make choices 
in their lives, including those that may 
lead to addictive behaviour (Heyman, 
2009; Foddy & Savulescu, 2010; Ainslie, 
2011). There is no need to presuppose the 
existence of a somatic or psychosomatic 
disease in order to explain the nature of 
addictive behaviour, as the theoretical 
framework used to explain the nature and 
scope of choice suffices for the purpose. 
In fact, according to this view, addiction 
is not much more than “a latent property 
of the rules of choice” (Heyman, 2010, p. 
159). The choice model does not claim 
that the addicted person actively chooses 
to become an addict to begin with. Never-
theless, due to the consequent choices the 
person can be labelled “as if addicted”. 
A paradigmatic example is drug addic-
tion that is understood as “repeated fail-
ures to refrain from drug use despite prior 
resolutions to do so” (Heather, 1998, p. 3). 
Although supporters of the choice model 
often exploit theories of economics, they 
do not deny the role of medical symptoms 
in the forms of addictive behaviours. In 
many cases the addicts have problems of 
medical nature, but this is not enough to 
conclude that biological factors lead to ad-
diction: the logic of choice is capable of 
explaining it, as those with addiction lack 
either willpower or the moral capacity to 
make the right decisions or their rational-
ity is deficient.7 This reference to ration-
ality usually implies defect in rationality 
that concerns the goals of the agent rather 
than merely instrumental, means-to-an-
end kind of, rationality.
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The personal responsibility of 
addicts in the two models
The responsibility of addicts is an impor-
tant issue with practical relevance for both 
theoretical views on addiction. The dis-
ease model faces an obvious challenge in 
this respect. Neuroscientific addiction re-
search is often taken to support “causally 
reductionist ideas” that one’s responsibil-
ity of own behaviour is greatly reduced by 
chemical, genetic and other biological fac-
tors that underlie the abnormal condition 
of addiction (Kincaid & Sullivan, 2010; 
Steenbergh, Runyan, Daugherty, & Wing-
er, 2012). In contrast, the choice model 
suggests that personal responsibility and 
rational choice have a far greater role in 
the development of addictive behaviour, 
or in a decision to end the consumption 
of addictive substance or a situation from 
which the individual obtains (potentially 
harmful) pleasure. In the disease model, 
the agent is not fully responsible for the 
development of addiction, but has an im-
portant role in the recovery through moti-
vation and compliance to treatment. 
Almost every publication on the dis-
ease model of addiction first asserts that 
addiction is a disease (and in most cases 
offers neuroscientific evidence in support 
of this view). However, the literature is in-
consistent in the sense that it claims that 
the individual is responsible for discon-
tinuing addictive behaviour and subse-
quent removal of addiction: motivation is 
in many cases a requirement to enter the 
substance abuse treatment facilities. At 
the same time, addiction is seen as an in-
voluntary disease. This point can be illus-
trated by comparing addiction to somatic 
diseases in which there is no demand for 
motivation to recover or get better in order 
to obtain care at the point of access to the 
health care system. Even if we accept the 
congruence between addiction and somat-
ic diseases, even many lifestyle diseases 
may turn out to be curable unlike previ-
ously suggested. For example, there are 
indications that Type II diabetes may in 
some cases be reversed within only a few 
months, suggesting that a total eradication 
in the future may be possible (Hammer et 
al., 2011). 
It can then be argued that theoretical 
differences are visible in the discussion 
about the role of personal responsibility. 
It is also important to note that without in-
voking discussion on the credibility of the 
disease/choice models of addiction, the 
clients of different addiction treatments 
are willing to adopt the theoretical stance 
of providers towards the concept of addic-
tion (Koski-Jännes, 2004; see also Russell 
et al., 2011). Thus, it has a strong relevance 
for the evaluation of successful treatment 
outcomes although to define “outcome” 
in the context of addiction treatment is a 
matter of debate itself. Basically it is about 
whether one sees the recovery as a result 
of a treatment intervention (as is the case 
if addiction is a disease), or more as a 
result of a choice (“opting out” to be an 
addict, or to discontinue living a life that 
involves addictive behaviour). This kind 
of polarisation of the two models sug-
gests that we need a better understanding 
of addicts’ agency and addiction, as such 
understanding affects the ways in which 
people are treated for their addictions. In 
particular, we need a finer model of addic-
tive behaviour in order to capture the ad-
dicts’ agency while we also acknowledge 
the potential suffering of addicts. A way to 
proceed might be that the addictive action 
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should not be reduced to simply an issue 
of choice nor to be seen as a disease.
Basic remarks on addiction
The discussion has so far concerned the 
different models of addiction in theoreti-
cal and institutional contexts. However, in 
order to focus on the details of a particular 
model of addiction, we need a rough char-
acterisation of the phenomenon we are in-
terested in. Typically, addiction is seen as 
a long-term dispositional condition with 
susceptibility to particular type of desires. 
The overview of the two opposing models 
highlights the Janus-faced nature of addic-
tion in terms of agency; the addicts seem 
to be compelled to act according to their 
addiction, while they do have some con-
trol over their action. It is evident that the 
way in which one understands addiction 
affects our analysis.8 It is doubtful whether 
a rigid definition with necessary and suf-
ficient conditions can be found; one that 
covers satisfactorily the phenomena in-
volved. Therefore, we present a character-
isation of addiction introduced by R. Jay 
Wallace in 1999 that captures features of 
the way in which one experiences addic-
tive desires.9 Unlike the two current prom-
inent diagnostic manuals, WHO’s ICD-10 
and APA’s DSM-IV, Wallace’s characterisa-
tion covers behavioural addictions as well 
as substance addiction.
As Wallace points out, strong desires are 
not exclusively experienced in addiction, 
but one can undergo such desires in other 
phenomena as well. For instance, such ap-
petitive desires as hunger fulfil these char-
acteristics. The first characteristic is that 
these desires are typically experienced as 
unusually resilient. In other words, an ad-
dictive desire assails the agent when left 
unsatisfied. This persistence seems to be 
detached from the agent’s own delibera-
tion concerning, for instance, the value the 
agent gives to satisfying the desire (Wal-
lace, 1999, p. 624). In the context of ad-
diction, it is easy to imagine a drug addict 
who needs a daily dose of the drug. If the 
desire is not satisfied in a certain time, the 
drug addict experiences withdrawal symp-
toms. The second characteristic concerns 
the experience of the desire being unusu-
ally intense. In fact, when describing these 
desires, people may generally depict them 
as cravings. The unsatisfied desire drowns 
out the agent’s deliberative outcomes if 
they happen to be against the desire. The 
third characteristic of addictive desire is 
its multifaceted connection to pleasure 
and pain. For instance, drug addicts can 
be seen to act in order to achieve pleas-
ure by getting high, but the addicts also 
need the drug in order to avoid painful 
withdrawal symptoms. The fourth charac-
teristic concerns the susceptibility of ad-
dictive desire in the sense that it typically 
has a physiological basis. For instance, 
repeated consumption of a drug may al-
ter the functions of transmitter substance 
in the addict’s reward system10 (Wallace, 
1999). The susceptibility means that ad-
dicts’ proneness to act in line with their 
addiction may be connected to the trans-
formations in their brains. These changes 
are induced by continuous drug use. Rob-
inson and Berridge (2008, p. 3137), for in-
stance, discuss sensitisation in the brain 
that is drug-induced. This sensitisation in 
the brain mesocorticolimbic system attrib-
utes “incentive salience to reward associ-
ated stimuli” (Robinson & Berridge, 2008, 
p. 3137). Addicts’ brains seem to be, then, 
wired up for detecting cues for activating 
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the addictive desire. Our elaboration on 
the experienced cravings and the disposi-
tion of susceptibility to those cravings is 
to illustrate the role they play in explain-
ing the difficulty that the agent faces when 
dealing with addictive desires.11 
The problem of disease model: 
control in one’s action
Being in control of one’s action is constitu-
tive of that person’s agency.12 If we accept, 
for the time being, that addiction is com-
pulsive, a disease that the person seems to 
have no control over, we need an under-
standing of that compulsion. Motivational 
compulsion should be distinguished from 
intrapersonal physically compulsive forc-
es such as seizures. It cannot be conceptu-
alised similar to interpersonal physical co-
ercion either. These two instances threat-
ening the person’s agency are distinct from 
the threat imposed by motivational com-
pulsion. The difference seems to lie at least 
in that the agent subjected to motivational 
compulsion is not able wholeheartedly to 
resist the compulsive force as one can, for 
instance,  an avalanche or a bouncer in a 
bar. Intrapersonal physical force, external 
physical forces of nature and successful 
interpersonal physical coercion all seem 
to take away the person’s freedom; the 
overpowering force overrides the person 
in a way that does not leave room for the 
person to act according to her intentions. 
A categorical understanding of compul-
sion is, therefore, not a plausible way of 
understanding the out-of-controlness of 
addicts. Nothing is forcing them in a sense 
that their control would be totally absent. 
However, an elaboration on the notion of 
control may provide a new way of un-
derstanding the out-of-controlness. John 
Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998, p. 
31) name two types of control over one’s 
action in light of responsibility: regulative 
control and guidance control. The agent 
uses regulative control when she is able 
to choose from alternatives and act oth-
erwise, while the agent does not need the 
ability to act otherwise, were she to use the 
latter, guidance control over her action. 
Leaving aside the metaphysical challenges 
of free will discussion about determinism 
and alternative possibilities, we are inter-
ested in seeing how addictive behaviour 
looks in relation to these notions.
In light of regulative control, addicts’ 
out-of-controlness would be understood 
as being categorical: since the addict is 
out of control, she is not able to act oth-
erwise. This form of compulsive action 
maintains that the agent does not literally 
have a choice. It may be that the addict 
cannot but will and judge that she should 
satisfy the desire and so she does. In case 
of unwilling addicts, moreover, no matter 
how the agent decides, judges or wills, she 
cannot but act according to the addictive 
desires. The agent is bypassed in a funda-
mental sense by the addictive desire, so it 
is not a question of choice in the same way 
as in physical compulsion with external 
force defeating the person. It seems clear 
that addiction is not this kind of case. Ba-
sically, addicts do have two alternatives 
available to them: to engage in their addic-
tive action or abstain from it. It is, then, a 
question of choice in this sense. There is 
ample empirical evidence for addicts be-
ing capable of choosing and, for instance, 
there is literature on whether heroin ad-
dicts are able to give informed consent to 
trials in which they are being given heroin 
(see more about empirical evidence and 
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informed consent in Foddy & Savulescu, 
2006; Levy, 2006).
The problem of choice model: 
insufficient explanatory features
If the problem of control in addiction does 
not involve pure force or the strength of 
desire overpowering the agent and thus 
eradicating her alternative ways of action, 
the focus shifts to the addict’s delibera-
tion. The US’s National Institute of Drug 
Abuse (2010, p. 20), for instance, states in 
their report that “[d]rug addiction erodes 
a person’s -- ability to make sound deci-
sions --”. It seems that the choices addicts 
make do not qualify as sound decisions. 
We analyse the ability to make sound de-
cisions by using the second notion of con-
trol introduced above, namely guidance 
control. This control is reason-responsive-
ness. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 89) 
define moderate reason-responsiveness as 
consisting in “regular reasons-receptivity, 
and at least weak reasons-reactivity, of the 
actual sequence mechanism that leads to 
the action”. If addiction as motivational 
compulsion impairs the agent’s sensitiv-
ity to digest reasons and react to them, the 
addict is not reason-responsive enough for 
having control over her action and cannot 
be seen to have made choices concerning 
her action. 
Addicts seem to have the first feature, 
reasons-receptivity, in terms of under-
standing the pros and cons of their addic-
tive action. Of course, addicts could be 
unable to understand the facts about the 
harm they are causing themselves (and 
others) by feeding the addiction or they 
may be disillusioned about some false be-
liefs concerning their addiction. This may 
well be the case in some instances, but 
typically addiction is not a question about 
the person’s inability to understand facts 
or about disillusions. Nevertheless, ad-
dicts may be self-deceptive in some sense 
thinking that they can easily quit when-
ever they want. Having an addiction per 
se does not seem to undermine addicts’ 
ability to understand reasons if receptivity 
is considered only in terms of having an 
addiction. Furthermore, it seems unlikely 
that experiencing addictive desire just 
suddenly demolishes one’s ability to take 
in reasons even if the desire may dispose 
one to favour reasons that support the sat-
isfaction of the desire.
As for reasons-reactivity, it may be the 
case that addiction lures the agent in com-
mitting actions that she would not have 
otherwise done. This could be done by 
making the reason to act in an addictive 
way seem more attractive than it would 
be in non-addicted circumstances. There 
have, nevertheless, been studies which 
show how addicts react to reasons such as 
price changes in the market (Levy, 2006; 
Foddy & Savulescu, 2006). This indicates 
that addicts do react to reasons. Further-
more, it can be asked that if the addictive 
desire provides such an overwhelming 
reason, how it is possible that heroin ad-
dicts may actually decide by themselves 
to experience withdrawal to lower their 
tolerance (see Ainslie, 2000, p. 80). Their 
decision to lower tolerance and the execu-
tion of that decision suggests that addic-
tion contains more than addictive desires 
that need to be satisfied. These decisions 
indicate that addicts do react to reasons. 
It should also be stated that it is not only 
in the case of addiction that certain rea-
sons appear more attractive, maybe even 
irresistible, to the agent than the rest. It 
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seems that every action that is commit-
ted with a strong vocation, value or other 
strong motivation, fits to the same kind 
of description of not being moderately 
reasons-reactive. It seems odd to consider 
that our urge to finish this paper at the 
cost of being late from meetings with our 
families and friends is due to compulsion 
even if it fails to be moderately reasons-
reactive. Reason-responsiveness seems to 
encounter problems in independently dis-
tinguishing between actions that are usu-
ally considered free and unfree (or com-
pelled) when the motivation is so strong 
that other reasons are overridden (Watson, 
1999, p. 9). 
The choice model of addiction appears 
to treat addicts’ choices on a par with 
choices made by non-addicts. This evalu-
ation is made on the basis of rationality of 
the choice involved; what are the utilities 
of future goods in relation to each other 
and the agent with or without her past ac-
tions. This kind of view misses the pos-
sibility that addicts may encounter dif-
ficulty in dealing with issues concerning 
their addiction. If the difficulty of addicts, 
as we argue, lies somewhere else than in 
rationality, the model leaves an essential 
feature outside of its scope and is thus in-
sufficient in capturing the problems of ad-
dicts’ agency. 
The motivation of addictive 
behaviour in light of affective 
choice model  
If addicts are responsive to reasons for ces-
sation or modification of their problematic 
behaviour, but nevertheless often fail to act 
on those reasons, then an obvious ques-
tion is how to explain this failure. If the 
problem is not in the addicts’ cognitive 
abilities, it must lie in factors that weaken 
their ability to act on reasons that are ra-
tional or sound in a longer term without 
still cancelling their agency. In philosophy 
and psychology, such role has tradition-
ally been given to affective states: emo-
tions, feelings, and strong desires. Indeed, 
the disease view of addiction recognises 
the role of positive affect, substance- or 
activity-induced reward, as the main mo-
tive of addictive behaviour. Even so, this 
view undermines the psychological aspect 
of affect by treating it as causally superflu-
ous in comparison to the neurophysiologi-
cal and neurochemical levels on which the 
actual causal mechanisms of behaviour are 
supposed to operate (Hyman, Malenka, & 
Nestler, 2006; Hyman, 2007). 
We believe that it is possible to give a 
more important motivational role to af-
fects by focusing on their influence on 
the addict’s decision-making. Instead of 
overriding an addict’s capacity of volun-
tary choice as the disease model suggests, 
affect conspires with her thinking and 
reasoning in support of choosing addic-
tive behaviour. This is the key idea of our 
affective choice model of addiction that 
identifies two main ways in which affec-
tive states motivate addictive behaviour. 
The first mechanism focuses on the capac-
ity of emotions and feelings to skew an ad-
dict’s cognitive and volitional perspective 
by influencing the parameters of rational 
choice. The second mechanism concerns 
the contribution of affect to the formation 
and maintenance of epistemic distortions. 
We claim that this interplay of affect and 
cognition is most conspicuous in behav-
ioural addictions even if all addictions in-
volve a psychological dependence to the 
intrinsically rewarding activity. One such 
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addiction is problem gambling in which 
cognitive distortions also play a signifi-
cant role. Thus, our discussion on the sec-
ond mechanism heavily relies on problem 
gambling. 
Affective motivations in decision-
making     
Affects are capable of influencing rational 
choices in at least two ways. First, antici-
pated positive affect raises the probability 
of choosing types of behaviour that yield 
such affect to the agent. In this way, an-
ticipated reward motivates addictive be-
haviour. Second, existing negative affects 
such as depression, anxiety, restlessness, 
irritability or shame raise the expected 
utility of behaviours that offer the agent 
an escape from the present misery. In this 
way, psychological withdrawal symptoms 
and other negative affects motivate addic-
tive behaviour, including relapses. Affects 
are also capable of influencing an addict’s 
parameters of choice in ways that make 
substance abuse or addictive behaviour 
a rational choice for the agent at the mo-
ment.
George Ainslie (1992) presents a theo-
retical solution to the ambivalence of ad-
dicts by reference to the phenomenon of 
hyperbolic discounting. Ainslie argues 
that addiction need not involve weakness 
of the will, i.e. acting against one’s own 
better judgment at the time of acting be-
cause there is a preference reversal due to 
the hyperbolic discounting of the future. 
Thus, an addict prefers the larger payoff of 
abstinence to the smaller payoff from sub-
stance use or addictive activity before they 
become available. However, since the pay-
off of abstinence lies in the future, it is dis-
counted to present value at earlier times. 
Since the discount function of future pay-
offs is hyperbolic rather than exponential 
in shape, it follows that the value of a 
smaller present payoff can exceed the val-
ue of a larger but delayed payoff when the 
smaller payoff becomes available (see Fig-
ure 1). Ainslie suggests that this phenom-
enon explains why addicts decide to have 
a drink, inject a shot, place a bet, and so on 
when these behaviours become available 
to them even if they sincerely prefer to ab-
stain from these activities at earlier points 
of time and between their relapses. Inso-
far as hyperbolic discounting of the future 
is a hardwired feature of organisms from 
pigeons to humans, as Ainslie suggests, it 
may be pointless to deem it irrational in 
all cases.
We leave it open whether or not hyper-
bolic discounting is an adequate account 
of the decision-making of addicts.13 Inso-
far as the model is correct, however, emo-
tions, feelings, and moods seem to con-
tribute to this kind of preference reversal 
in several ways. All these affective states 
share the tendency to narrow the subject’s 
perspective of salience to the present situ-
ation and immediately foreseeable future. 
This tendency is associated with the gen-
eral function of affective states and emo-
tions in particular: to alert subjects to 
objects and events in their present envi-
ronment that are significant to their sur-
vival, well-being or other vital concerns 
as well as to motivate adaptive responding 
to these situations. Emotions can thus be 
characterised as hasty evaluations of ob-
jects and events on the basis of their per-
ceptually salient qualities. The fact that 
emotional evaluations may conflict with 
the agent’s reflective and considered eval-
uative judgments shows that emotional 
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evaluations typically operate with a limit-
ed set of evidence. Yet the affective arous-
al and valence of emotions marks present 
situations as more important and urgent in 
comparison to the affectively faint and not 
yet present future prospects. This explains 
why the short-term choice with concrete, 
perceptually salient options often out-
weighs the long-term choice with abstract 
and hypothetical options as our strategy 
of decision-making; affect tips the balance 
between local and global frames of refer-
ence in favour of the former, adding an af-
fective surplus to available smaller payoffs 
that raises their present value over the dis-
counted value of larger future payoffs (El-
ster 1999b; Baumeister, DeWall, & Zhang, 
2007; Gailliot & Tice 2007). 
There is empirical evidence that intense 
affect motivates addictive behaviour by 
modulating information processing and 
decision-making. Baker and others (2004) 
invoke a distinction between cold and hot 
modes of information processing, intro-
duced by Metcalfe and Mischell (1999) in 
their account of addiction motivation. The 
cool system is cognitive, integrative and 
reflective, and it predominates when the 
organism operates close to an affectively 
neutral state. In contrast, high levels of 
stress and associated negative affect acti-
vate a hot information processing system 
that is fast and bottom-up in nature, and 
relatively modular in the sense of being 
unaffected by pre-existing declarative 
knowledge. The hot processing system 
also involves “a strong attentional bias 
that directs attention to stimuli or events 
that are associated with stress or emo-
tional activation” (Baker, Piper, McCarthy, 
Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004, p. 42). 
Baker and others (2004) maintain that 
affective incentives to addictive behaviour 
come mainly from withdrawal symptoms 
even if other stressors and negative affects 
may also become associated with addic-
tive motivation. Addicts have learnt that 
they can alleviate and escape withdrawal 
by self-administration of the substance to 





Figure 1: Preference reversal due to hyperbolic 
discounting (adapted from Elster 1999b).   
At time 1 the agent has a choice between a small 
reward that will be available at time 2 and a larger 
reward that will be available at time 3. The curves 
I and II show how these future rewards are 
hyperbolically discounted to present value at 
earlier times.  
  
.
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tion strategy may also generalise to other 
affective stressors as Khantzian (1997) in 
his self-medication model of addiction 
has argued. When negative affects mount, 
cues associated with substance use become 
more vivid and compelling, overriding de-
clarative memory and controlled cognitive 
processes or enlisting them to the service of 
promoting and rationalising substance use. 
In this transition from cold to hot cogni-
tion, short-term hedonic goals ascend over 
long-term eudaemonic goals, reversing the 
addict’s preferences in the situation. 
It is important to observe that the affec-
tive rearrangement of goals need not ham-
per the agent’s instrumental rationality in 
achieving her goals; indeed, addicts can be 
as good as other agents in this respect. Hot 
cognition operates at another level as it 
contributes to the frame-change from long 
to short-term goals and mutes or deranges 
the somatic markers whose function is to 
protect us from recurrent adverse choices 
by highlighting those choices with antici-
patory negative affect (Damasio, 1994). 
Strong affect thus impairs the decision-
making of addicts in a manner that is con-
sistent with choice models of addiction 
that portray addicts as maximisers of their 
short-term utility. However, Baker and 
others’ affective processing model com-
plements the choice model by describing 
an affective mechanism and an adjacent 
type of information processing that make 
it so difficult for addicts to break free from 
this frame. 
Affective motivations of cognitive 
distortions
Emotions and feelings undermine an ad-
dict’s decision-making more severely 
when they not merely reverse an agent’s 
preferences but also contribute to the for-
mation and maintenance of irrational be-
liefs. Strong feelings tend to elicit a search 
for supporting beliefs, and emotional feel-
ings are treated as internal evidence for 
the associated beliefs whose plausibility 
and probability estimates are liable to af-
fectively motivated bias. This empirically 
well-known phenomenon is called moti-
vated irrationality. “The emotional person 
acts like a prosecutor or a defence lawyer 
seeking by any means to find evidence for 
the belief”, as Clore and Gasper (2000, p. 
33) eloquently emphasise (see also Elster, 
1999b). Biased and irrational beliefs are 
important for addicts as rationalisations 
and justifications of their addictive be-
haviours at the time of acting. Moreover, 
cognitive distortions motivate addictive 
behaviour by offering the agent ad hoc rea-
sons for acting on her reversed preferenc-
es. Problem gambling provides a particu-
larly illustrative example in this respect 
even if all addicts are prone to affectively 
motivated cognitive distortions.
Addicted gamblers are liable to several 
irrational beliefs concerning their activity 
(see Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, 
Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997; Ladouceur, 
Sylvain, Letarte, Giroux, & Jacques, 1998; 
Elster 1999a; Ladouceur et al., 2001; 
Mitrovic & Brown, 2009). They often be-
lieve that they can control game machines 
or learn to calculate probabilities and 
regularities even in games of pure chance. 
Control over one’s own moves in the game 
gives rise to an illusion about the possibil-
ity to control the game itself. To support 
this illusion, gamblers apply such rein-
forcement mechanisms as the “psychology 
of the near-win”. Here an outcome that on 
some logic is sufficiently close to the gam-
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bler’s bet is interpreted as evidence of the 
gambler’s ability to predict the outcome 
and thus control the game. In games of 
pure chance, such as roulette, the concept 
of near-win is pure superstition, whereas 
in games that involve a mix of chance and 
skill, such as sports betting, near-wins 
show that the gambler was at least onto 
something. Yet even here near-wins can 
produce overly optimistic assessments of 
one’s gambling skill as they are interpreted 
much the same way as actual wins. Gam-
blers do not willingly share most of these 
beliefs with other people because the de-
lusiveness of those beliefs would become 
evident to themselves and others. In this 
way, problem gamblers are able to stick to 
their fallacious beliefs.
Dickerson and O’Connor (2006) argue 
that cognitive distortions serve a problem 
gambler’s strong desire to pursue the in-
trinsically pleasant activity of gambling 
even in the face of losses. Cognitive distor-
tions serve this desire by providing post-
hoc explanations and justifications of im-
paired control over gambling. In order to 
explain and justify their loss of control to 
themselves as well as to others, problem 
gamblers try to portray their behaviour 
as more rational and controlled than it is. 
Thus, players have a systematic tendency 
to “ascribe their wins to the superiority 
of their own skills and losses to ‘natural 
variance’, ‘a bad run of cards’, or simply 
‘bad luck’” as Bjerg (2011, p. 124) remarks. 
In this way, players purport to take emo-
tional credit for their wins while avoiding 
emotional costs of their losses. However, 
this strategy of emotion regulation back-
fires in a manner that highlights the role of 
emotions as motives of a gambler’s cogni-
tive distortions.  
Everyone knows that winning is fun. 
However, it is even more fun when one 
can attribute the outcome to one’s skill 
and competence in mastering the game 
and/or triumphing over one’s adversar-
ies, as this causal attribution allows one to 
take pride in one’s success. This strategy 
of emotion regulation feeds epistemic dis-
tortions about skill and competence. How-
ever, taking emotional credit from all wins 
and attributing all losses to “bad luck” is a 
detrimental emotion regulation strategy in 
the long run, as it results in an appearance 
that chance is always against the player 
(Tendler, 2011). This appearance gives 
rise to feelings of moral indignation about 
unexpected or consecutive losses that also 
gnaw at the player’s positive self-images of 
skill and competence, inducing feelings of 
shame and humiliation (Rosenthal, 1995). 
These negative emotions dispose players 
to tilting, characterised by deteriorated de-
cision-making in gambling, loss of control 
over the activity, and chasing losses. Chas-
ing is not directed merely at recouping 
monetary losses but also positive self-feel-
ings by restoring a “fair balance” between 
wins and losses (Lesieur, 1984; Rosenthal, 
1995; Rugle, 2004; Palomäki, Laakasuo, & 
Salmela, submitted). Unfortunately, chas-
ing in an emotionally upset state leads 
to further losses which aggravate feelings 
of anger, humiliation and self-blame and 
bring on other costs; financial and so-
cial (Browne, 1989; Ricketts & Macaskill, 
2004). Superstitious beliefs in the influ-
ence of Lady Luck or other metaphysical 
agents that are held responsible for bad 
luck emerge here to protect the player’s 
positive self-images and emotions that as-
sociate with those images. 
Accordingly, it seems that problem gam-
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blers differ from non-problem gamblers by 
having more frequent and/or intense self-
focused emotions such as pride, anger, 
shame and humiliation about themselves 
as winners or losers in addition to such 
game-focused emotions as excitement, 
disappointment and joy during gambling. 
Negative self-focused emotions are more 
difficult and exhaustive to regulate during 
play than similar game-focused emotions, 
as they demand either actual or symbolic 
undoing of the “harm” inflicted on the self. 
Furthermore, the self-focused emotions of 
problem gamblers associate with their cog-
nitive distortions about skill and compe-
tence–either about the player’s own skills 
and competence, or about the role of skill 
and chance in the structure of the game, 
or both (Bjerg, 2010). These and other cog-
nitive distortions allow players to savour 
positive feelings about their wins, while 
avoiding or suppressing negative feelings 
about losses. Nevertheless, the more emo-
tional credit the player takes for her wins, 
the harder her losses backfire in the long 
run in the form of anger, humiliation and 
self-blame, which increase the probability 
of chasing losses and positive self-feelings 
by the means of further gambling.
Concluding remarks
This article has tried to provide a view 
on addiction in terms of socio-ethically 
contextualised and neuroscientifically in-
formed philosophy. It is clear that whilst 
discussing the context of the policies and 
research on addiction gives us valuable in-
formation on the interests and objectives 
of those agents, it does not provide us with 
“a correct answer” to some definitional 
questions on addiction. Moreover, merely 
by looking at the mechanisms of addiction 
in the brain’s reward system does not pro-
vide answers extensively to the theoretical 
challenges brought about by addiction, nor 
does it imply that the agent’s control is un-
dermined in the sense that the addicts are 
deprived of reasons to resist the addiction 
and responsibility for doing so.
The two models discussed here fail as 
such to capture the challenges in addicts’ 
agency when analysed in terms of control 
qua reason-responsiveness. There seems 
to be no clear reason why addicts would 
fail to fulfil the criterion for regular rea-
son-receptivity, as addiction seems hardly 
characteristic of disillusions or problems 
of understanding in that sense. As regards 
“at least weak reason reactivity”, addicts 
seem to react to reasons in their action. 
They consequently appear to be reason-
responsive and, in this sense, in control. 
They do not differ from non-addicted 
agents in this framework. In particular, 
even in the cases in which the agent’s self-
control is challenged by constant craving, 
it should be considered that the agent is 
free to act in whichever way. Addictive 
desires do not incapacitate the agent.14 
What we want to suggest is that while the 
disease model is flawed, the choice model 
needs to account for the difficulties ad-
dicts face in their agency. Without this 
acknowledgement the choice model, we 
argue, remains insufficient. What is there-
fore called for is a model that captures 
addicts’ agency while acknowledging dif-
ficulty–that difficulty in particular which 
involves affects. 
From the perspective of our affective 
choice model, addictive behaviour ap-
pears as a maladaptive means of emotion 
regulation. Addicts purport to escape from 
hedonically negative states into hedoni-
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cally positive, exciting, stimulating and/
or soothing, affective states by means of 
substance abuse or addictive behaviour, 
as the self-medication model of Khantz-
ian (1997) suggests. Unfortunately, addic-
tive behaviour is a maladaptive means of 
emotion regulation, as its long-term con-
sequences almost always exceed its short-
term benefits. Our affective choice model 
specifies the ways in which an addict’s 
emotions and feelings conspire with her 
reasoning and decision-making in sup-
port of continuing addictive behaviour. 
When this conspiracy succeeds, the utility 
of consumption “now” with its immedi-
ate hedonic consequences outweighs the 
long-term costs for health and well-being 
that disappear out of sight. In this way, af-
fective influences on reasoning and deci-
sion-making make it difficult for an addict 
to quit or modify her behaviour even if she 
could do so were she so to decide. Alterna-
tive means of emotion regulation may help 
an addict to modify her behaviour in light 
of reasons that support abstinence, and the 
ability to act on those reasons renders an 
addict responsible for her actions. Accord-
ingly, the talk about the compulsiveness of 
addiction is misleading, as it distorts the 
problems addicts encounter in their agen-
cy. Instead, the difficulty in addicts’ agen-
cy is explainable in terms of affects and 
their impact on the agent’s motivation. 
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 NOTES
1 It may be argued that the contrast between 
these models is too sharp and, especially, 
that the concept of disease is implausi-
ble. Indeed, we agree that the concept of 
disease would benefit from a finer analysis. 
Nevertheless, we do not question here the 
plausibility of the dichotomy but take it 
simply as given. An unequivocal exemplar 
of the existing dichotomy can be found, 
for instance, in the first issue of 2012 of 
The Lancet where the Director of the US 
National Institute on Drug Abuse Nora 
Volkow is quoted as saying “[a]ddiction is a 
disease not a choice” (Jones, 2012, p. 20).
2 As our anonymous reviewer points out, the 
concept of control is complex. We have, 
however, chosen the notion we are using 
by taking into account the context and 
thereby using the kind of notion that is in 
philosophical literature considered to be 
relevant in light of responsible agency, i.e. 
the factor on which the dichotomy rests.
3 The scope of the article does not allow us 
to deal with the notion of control in terms 
of self-governance, for instance. We con-
centrate on this notion that is determined 
by the difference between the two models. 
For recent discussion on the complexity of 
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self-governance and the “true” self, see, for 
instance, Andreou (2012).
4 We assume that behavioural addictions 
such as gambling are addictions even if we 
are aware that this assumption is contro-
versial. Recent studies have, however, 
explored the common neurobiological basis 
for substance addictions and behavioural 
addictions with at least some success (see 
Kaasinen, Halme, & Alho, 2009, p. 2075; 
Petry, 2006; Potenza 2006; Potenza 2009).
5 As our anonymous reviewer pointed out, 
different models serve different purposes 
and may thus differ from each other. We 
agree that the purpose of the model obvi-
ously affects its constitution and its use 
should be taken into account. Our purpose 
is to develop a general philosophical model 
of addicts’ behaviour that succeeds in ex-
plaining addicts’ actual behaviour and that 
can be further developed and explicated for 
various purposes of, for instance, therapeu-
tic nature and policies.
6 The medical concept suggests lack of con-
trol required for responsibility. Of course 
this is not the only possible notion of the 
concept. However, we apply this notion 
because of its use in the dichotomy. For a 
more elaborated view on the disease con-
cept see, for instance, Ries, Fiellin, Miller 
and Saitz (2009).
7 Depending on the particular choice model 
of addiction in question, the models have 
different takes on what is in error, if any-
thing, with addicts’ choices. For instance, 
Becker and Murphy’s (1988) rational choice 
theory of addiction assumes that noth-
ing is in error, i.e. addicts act according 
to their stable preferences, while Ainslie 
(2000) suggests that a model of addiction 
needs to account for addicts’ changing their 
preferences. While the standard rational 
theory suffers from quite grave problems 
of accounting for unstable preferences, 
relapse or sudden shifts to heavy consump-
tion, Ainslie’s hyperbolic discounting 
faces problems too, as we explicate later 
in the paper (for more detailed criticism 
on rational choice theory, see Skog (1999, 
p. 192). All in all, the choice model we 
characterise here rests on the point that 
these different choice models all assume 
that addicts choose and this choosing relies 
heavily on some kind of notion of rational-
ity. Our criticism is that these models leave 
an important feature of addiction out.   
8 There is an ongoing discussion whether it 
is useful to have an umbrella term such as 
addiction to cover all the varieties of the 
phenomena we ordinarily call addictions 
with their variety of intrinsic and extrinsic 
features and characteristics (see Foddy & 
Savulescu, 2006). 
9 Having addictive desires is obviously not 
sufficient for the phenomenon of addiction. 
One needs other indicators such as genetic 
and social factors as well.
10 Of course, non-addicted people also have 
reward systems that regulate and control 
the behaviour relating to pleasure.
11 Drug and alcohol dependencies are as-
sociated with a cognitive processing bias: 
substance use is associated with enhanced 
attention to drug-related stimuli, which has 
been suggested to be related to craving. Do-
pamine seems to play an important role in 
this mechanism, and it has been suggested 
to be central to the core mechanism(s) of 
addiction. (Franken, Hendriks, Stam, & 
Van Den Brink, 2004; Robinson & Berridge, 
2008; see also Lewis, 2011).
12 There are obviously different ways of un-
derstanding what this control involves and 
how it works (cf. Lowe, 2008, pp. 195–196).
13 The main problem with the hyperbolic 
discounting model is that it is incapable 
of explaining the behaviour of unwilling 
addicts who act against their preferences 
at the moment of acting. If such behav-
iour is empirically possible, then Donald 
Davidson (1980) is correct in claiming that 
at least some addictive behaviours involve 
weakness of the will. However, this ques-
tion is not relevant to our affective choice 
model because strong emotions and feel-
ings have been invoked in the explanation 
of the weakness of the will since Aristotle’s 
seminal discussion of this phenomenon.  
14 There may well be instances of intense 
withdrawal that literally incapacitate the 
agent, but these cases are hardly the para-
digm case of addiction.
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